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1958] RECENT DECISIONS 645 
LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-RIGHT OR POWER OF MUNICIPAL-
mES To ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-Plaintiff, Weakley County 
Municipal Electric System, sought to enjoin defendant union members 
and unions from continuing alleged picketing, intimidation of non-strikers 
and other acts incidental to a strike. Defendants had gone on strike to 
compel plaintiffs to recognize Local Union 835, IBEW, as the bargaining 
agent of plaintiffs' employees and to sign a contract with the union. The 
chancellor granted a permanent injunction on the ground that the strike 
was illegal and against public policy, as a municipality has no right or 
power to bargain collectively. On appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, 
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held, affirmed. Even though the county was acting in a proprietary capacity 
in operating a public utility, it had no authority, absent express statutory 
authorization, to bargain collectively with its employees as the union 
demanded; as even peaceful picketing for an unlawful purpose may be 
enjoined, the permanent injunction was properly granted. Weakley County 
Municipal Electric System v. Vick, (Tenn. App. 1957) 33 CCH Lab. Gas. 
170,874. 
The principal case illustrates the almost unanimous reluctance of 
courts in the few decisions1 directly in point to hold that municipal cor-
porations have the power -to bargain collectively with their employees. 
Although the Tennessee Municipal Electric Plant Law of 1935 under 
which plaintiff was organized contained provisions2 granting municipali-
ties the power to contract in the operation and maintenance of electric 
plants, as well as an instruction •that such power be liberally construed,3 
the court here found "no provision which could possibly authorize the' 
collective bargaining contract demanded by defendant in this case."4 
Moreover, such bargaining, even by a municipality admittedly acting in 
a proprietary capacity,5 was held to be contrary to public policy and 
illegal. 6 While the opinion of the court gave little detailed analysis of 
1 Paucity of authority on the precise issue of the municipality's right to engage in 
collective bargaining has unfortunately tended to encourage courts to rely upon precedents 
involving related but clearly distinguishable issues, e.g., the right of municipal employees 
to strike, closed shops in public employment. For an extensive annotation on these and 
other issues concerning unions in public employment, see 31 A.L.R. (2d) 1142 to 1180 
(1953). 
2 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934; 1942 Repl.) §3708.3: "•Every municipality shall 
have power . . . (g) ... to make all other contracts and execute all other instruments 
as in the discretion of the municipality may be necessary, proper or advisable in or for 
the furtherance of the acquisition, improvement, operation and maintenance of any 
electric plant and the furnishing of electric service. . . ." Cf. Local 266, !BEW v. Salt 
River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P. (2d) 
393 (1954), and Civil Service Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 3 Misc. (2d) 
346, 151 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1956), where similar language was ·held to give sufficient au-
thority to enter into bargaining agreements, on the facts of those cases. 
3 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934; 1942 Repl.) §3708.24. 
4 Principal case at 94,642. 
5 The distinction between proprietary and governmental functions, as a basis for 
finding collective •bargaining rights for the former, has been generally rejected. Relevant 
considerations ·have been said to be the same regardless of classification of £unction. 
Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W. (2d) 539 (1947); Nutter v. Santa Monica, 
74 Cal. App. (2d) 292, 168 P. (2d) 741 (1946); Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and 
Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 36, 210 P. (2d) 305 (1949); 1 TELLER, 
LABOR DISPUTF.S AND COLLECl'JVE BARGAINING (1947 Cum. Supp.) §171; RHYNE, LABOR. 
UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 53 (1946). But see State ex rel. Moore v. Julian, 
359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W. (2d) 720 (1949). 
6 Absence of express legislative direction has left the courts generally free to apply 
their own conceptions of public policy. Congressional legislation ensuring collective 
bargaining rights to employees in private industry has excluded the states and their 
political subdivisions from the definition of "employer." Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §152(2). State labor legislation granting similar 
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the basis for such conclusion, relying primarily upon citation of precedents 
in other jurisdictions, the importance of denying to large numbers7 of 
municipal employees a right ensured to private employees justifies an ex-
amination of possible grounds. One argument often made8 against the 
right is that such bargaining would conflict with existing administrative 
or legislative civil service provisions covering such matters as wages, hours, 
promotions, and hiring. Several objections may be raised to this conten-
tion: (1) it has no bearing as to employees9 or matters not covered by 
civil service; (2) collective bargaining agreements could be stated to be 
subject to such civil service provisions10 and in any case would yield, 
in case of conflict, to such provisions if legislative; (3) where adminis-
trative officials are vested with powers over such matters, they could 
properly be made party to such agreements-so that the objection goes 
to the persons with whom to negotiate rather than to power; (4) so far 
as based on provisions regulating hiring or firing, it is an objection to 
possible provisions of such contracts, viz., closed or union shops, rather 
than to the power to contract generally. A second recurring argument is 
that such agreements would be an unlawful delegation of discretion vested 
in administrative officials or city legislative councils by the state legis-
lature.11 Objections to this argument include: (1) an agreement can as 
easily be regarded as an exercise of his discretion by an administrative 
rights has been restrictively interpreted by several courts as inapplicable to public em-
ployees. Springfield v. Clouse, note 5 supra; Miami Waterworks Local No. 654 v. Miami, 
157 Fla. (2d) 445, 26 S. (2d) 194 (1946); Nutter v. Santa Monica, note 5 supra. A state 
legislature might expressly declare collective bargaining contracts by municipalities to 
be contrary to public policy and void. See Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5154c. Or 
the legislature might expressly empower municipalities to bargain collectively with 
certain groups of employees. See Wash. Rev. Code (1951) §35.22.350. 
7 As of October, 1956, there were an estimated 3,953,200 local government employees. 
STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 501 (1957). 
s Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. Miami, note 6 supra; Nutter v. Santa Monica, 
note 5 supra; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, 
note 5 supra. See RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 53 et seq. (1946), 
as to this and other arguments infra. 
9 Of 1,041 cities over ten thousand which reported, 306 cities had no civil service and 
457 ihad a system covering only some of its employees. 1957 MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 152. 
The opinion in the principal case does not state whether Weakley County Electrical 
System employees are under civil service, and the full discretion over hiring and com-
pensation granted the superintendent indicates that they are not. Tenn. Code Ann. 
(Williams, 1934; 1942 Rep!.) §3708.24. However, the court stated the facts •here were most 
similar to Miami Waterworks Local No. 654 v. ,Miami, note 6 supra, where all employees 
were covered by civil service. 
10 Civil Service Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, note 2 supra, upheld a 
collective •bargaining agreement between the Authority and two unions against attack by 
the Civil Service Forum, as the agreement contained such provisions. 
11 Springfield v. Clouse, note 5 supra; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and 
Construction Trades Council, note 5 supra. See also Mugford v. City Council of Baltimore, 
185 Md. 266, 44 A. (2d) 745 (1945). 
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official;12 (2) although the power to modify is relinquished for a time, 
this is true of any contract by a public oflicial.13 A third argument 
is that collective bargaining agreements would give unlawful preferences 
to union members and discriminate against non-union members, which 
a government cannot do;14 but clearly this is relevant only to possible 
specific provisions for a closed or union shop or compulsory check-off, and 
does not_ apply to contracts lacking such provisions. So long as individ-
ual employees retain the right to present their grievances personally, a 
fourth argument that recognition of a union as a bargaining agent would 
infringe the right to petition the government for redress of grievances also 
seems inapplicable. Thus the arguments typically made for concluding 
that a municipality lacks power to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments are at least subject to question. It is submitted that the decision as 
to the presence or fack of such power is best reserved until a specific 
agreement is before the court, rather than ruling in advance that no 
such contract could conceivably be valid and using 1:his as a basis to 
enjoin striking or picketing. The underlying basis of the holding, however, 
may be objection to the assertion by government employees of a right 
to strike and engage in other activities incidental to a strike. Since this 
is a distinct issue subject to attacks other than on the basis of the unlawful 
purpose doctrine, a court might well enjoin such activities without pros-
pectively barring any and all possible collective bargaining agreements. 
Allen C. Dewey, S.Ed. 
12 Cf. Non11alk Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education, Ill8 Conn. 269, 83 A. (2d) 
482 (1951). 
18 See Local 266, IB'.EW v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power 
District, note 2 supra. 
14 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, note 5 
supra; RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE I.Aw 137 (1946). See also Civil 
Service Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, note 2 supra, where this was the 
plaintiff's main contention. 
